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LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE: OTHER ALTERNATIVES
FOR SEABED MINING?
HASJIM DJALAL*
The Law of the Sea negotiations have been taking place for over
ten years. The negotiations were started in 1967 by the United Nations
in an Ad Hoc Committee' and continued by the United Nations Sea-
bed Committee2 whose membership was subsequently enlarged several
times until it reached almost one hundred member states. The formal
conference began with a procedural conference in 1973, which was fol-
lowed by a substantive conference in Caracas in 1974.1 Unlike the 1958
and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences, which were prepared by the In-
ternational Law Commission over a period of ten years, the current
Law of the Sea negotiations were initiated by the United Nations Com-
mittee consisting of its member states.4
It is clear, therefore, that the results of the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence represents a universality of opinion and compromise reached by
both members and non-members of the United Nations. This fact is
extremely important in assessing the results of the Conference. While
*Ambassador Hasjim Djalal is Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the
United Nations and a Vice-Chairman of the Indonesian Delegation to the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The opinions expressed in this article, how-
ever, are his own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Indonesian
Government.
1. G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/6964 (1967).
2. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea and the Ocean
Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction was created by G.A. Res. 2467, 23 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/7477 (1968) to continue the work of the Ad
Hoc Committee on a permanent basis.
3. G.A. Res. 3067, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30A), U.N. Doc. A/9278 (1973), re-
printed in THIRD UNITED NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OmCIAL
RECORDS VII (1975). Procedural matters (such as the election of officers, agenda, etc.)
were dealt with during the First Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea held in New York from December 3-14, 1973. Id. Substantive matters
were dealt with during the Second Session of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, held in Caracas from June 20 to August 29, 1974. Id.
4. C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW THE SUBSTANCE, PROCESSES, PROCEDURES AND INSTI-
TUTIONS FOR WORLD PEACE WITH JUSTICE 140-41 (1971). The International Law Commis-
sion is composed of twenty-one members of recognized competence in international law,
elected by the United Nations General Assembly for a term of three years. The members
are not representatives of their respective countries, but rather serve in their individual
capacities as experts in international law. As a result of the work done by the Commis-
sion, international conventions have been signed and entered into force concerning the
territorial sea and contiguous zone, the high seas, fishing and conservation of the living
resources of the high seas and the continental shelf. Id.
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the preparatory works of the previous conferences can arguably be
called the mere opinions of the limited members of the International
Law Commission, the result of the Law of the Sea negotiations cannot
be attributed to any individual state or group of states participating in
the Conference. The results and the compromises achieved during the
current Law of the Sea negotiations must be regarded as representing
the view of the world community and thus, as indicative of the type of
International Law of the Sea that will be acceptable to the vast major-
ity of states in the world. It cannot be regarded as merely reflecting the
views of a limited forum.
The mandate of the current Law of the Sea negotiations was es-
tablished by the General Assembly in 1970,5 expressing the intent of
the Law of the Sea Conference to "deal with all matters relating to the
Law of the Sea."$ The intent was to create a comprehensive set of rules
and regulations covering as many matters of importance as possible.
Due to the complexity of the topics, the sheer number of problems and
issues presented, and the competing interests involved, these negotia-
tions have been extended to the present time. The Conference, so far,
has been faithful in its objective of seeking to conclude a comprehen-
sive treaty. The importance of this treaty makes partial or piecemeal
solutions to Law of the Sea issues undesirable, adverse to the best in-
terests of the world community and contrary to the General Assembly
Resolution of 1970.
The Law of the Sea negotiations have been able to resolve many of
the problems presented, resulting in the formulation of articles on
most issues.7 The Conference has practically solved issues relating to
the limit of territorial seas,6 regime of straits used for international
navigation, 9 archipelagic states,10 exclusive economic zone,'1 continen-
tal shelf,' high seas," islands,"' enclosed and semi-enclosed seas,",
landlocked states,'6 marine scientific research,' pollution control, 18
5. G.A. Res. 2750, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 25, U.N. Doe. A/8097 (1970).
6. Id.
7. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Draft Convention on
the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L.78 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention].
8. Id. arts. 3-16.
9. Id. arts. 34-45.
10. Id. arts. 46-54.
11. Id. arts. 55-75.
12. Id. arts. 76-85.
13. Id. arts. 86-120.
14. Id. art. 121.
15. Id. arts. 122, 123.
16. Id. arts. 124-132.
17. Id. arts. 238-265.
18. Id. arts. 207-237.
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transfer of technology,1' dispute settlements 0 and various aspects re-
lating to deep seabed mining.2 1 These monumental achievements were
the results of hard work and honest attempts by participating states to
reach compromises in the Conference.
Admittedly, there are still some issues that need to be resolved. All
participants in the Conference are currently giving their utmost efforts
to seek solutions to those pending issues, hoping that the Law of the
Sea Conference can be brought to a successful end as soon as possible.
Given the seriousness with which the participants of the conference
have tackled their problems during the last several years, there is no
reason to doubt that the few remaining issues will be solved. In fact, as
late as 1980, all concerned were optimistic that those issues would be
resolved in 1981 so that the comprehensive treaty could be signed in
Caracas before the end of 1981.
It was, therefore, a shock to the Conference and to the world com-
munity that precisely during this most optimistic period in the Law of
the Sea negotiations, the United States announced that it was review-
ing the results of the Conference and would not be prepared to con-
clude the negotations as agreed and as scheduled."s The United States
review process has resulted in the stalling of negotiations on the vari-
ous other unresolved issues.
The reasons for the United States decision to review the previous
results of the Conference are, to say the least, enigmatic and perplex-
ing. First, if as claimed, the review was necessitated by the change of
administrations in the United States, then why have the many changes
of administrations that have taken place throughout the world during
the process of treaty negotiations not resulted in similar review? In
fact, during the last ten or twelve years, there have been a number of
19. Id. arts. 266-278.
20. Id. arts. 279-299.
21. Id. arts. 133-191.
22. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (April 29, 1982) (testimony of James
Malone). Representing the views of the Reagan Administration, Mr. Malone testified
that the Administration would delay progress toward consummation of the treaty pend-
ing an inter-agency review. This review will be conducted at a high governmental level
and will include representatives from the State Department, Defense Department, Com-
merce Department, Interior Department and the Environmental Protection Agency. Id.
at 8. Declining to state how long the review would last, Mr. Malone announced that the
Administration was primarily concerned with the activities of the Enterprise, contending
that it may, in the future, monopolize production of seabed minerals. Id. at 4. The Ad-
ministration is also concerned that the Draft Convention could lead to compulsory trans-
fers of technology from private companies to the Enterprise, as well as to the developing
countries, at inadequate compensation rates. Further, the Administration fears that reve-
nue sharing provisions could lead to the receipts of funds by national liberation organiza-
tions including the Palestine Liberation Organization. Id. at 4.
19811
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changes in the United States' administrations (1969, 1974 and 1977)
without causing any serious problems for the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions. The negotiations have been conducted by the United States on a
seemingly non-partisan basis by both Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations, with members of both parties as delegation heads. Fur-
thermore, a review process is not something that is unique to the
United States. Practically all states participating in the Conference
usually conduct a review before every new session.
Second, the United States has claimed that the review process was
required to enable the legislature to debate the treaty. This reason is
also difficult to understand. The need for the representative organs of a
state to agree on an international treaty through a process of ratifica-
tion is also not unique to the United States. It is the practice in virtu-
ally all countries. In fact, the United States Senate, at least as far as
most member states have been led to believe, has been constantly in-
formed and consulted by the members of the United States delegation
during the process of treaty negotiation. The United States Senate is,
in fact, the most consulted national institution on the Law of the Sea
negotiations, when compared to its counterparts in other participating
states.
Moreover, assuming the United States review process was in-
tended to question the Law of the Sea negotiation process, and the
compromise and consensus achieved to date, then the review has
caused significant apprehension and fear of negotiation failure due to
the possibility of private negotiation and argument outside of the
United Nations forum. The Law of the Sea negotiations, as stated ear-
lier, have been conducted by sovereign and independent states through
the United Nations, which is perhaps the best means and the most
effective forum available today for reaching agreement among states in
order to safeguard world peace and security, as well as to promote co-
operation and development among states. Negotiating on such a wide-
ranging and important issue as the Law of the Sea, outside the context
of the United Nations, would only perpetuate confusion. It is, there-
fore, to be 'profoundly r~gretted if the United States review process
resulted from a lack of confidence in the United Nations process of
negotiation. If this is the reason behind the United States review, then
it might possibly lead to the seeking of solutions to the Law of the Sea
issues outside the forum of the -United Nations, a possibility that must
be strongly resisted.
There was a confusion for a while as to just what would be the
scope of the United States review. Some indications were that it would
be limited to the results previously achieved by the Law of the Sea
Conference on seabed mining. Other indications were that it would
cover all subjects in the Law of the Sea Conference, including naviga-
tion and other issues. Whatever the scope of review, many hoped that
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the United States review process would conclude that the Law of the
Sea Conference had solved major international issues to the satisfac-
tion and advantage of the United States. It seems almost inconceivable
that the United States would regard the issue of seabed mining, which
is only a small fraction of the whole range of Law of the Sea issues, as
an issue that would make or break the Conference, yet this appears to
be the case.
During the long years of negotiations, both progress and compro-
mise have been achieved with regard to seabed mining. The conflict
between the developing countries 3 and the industrial countries2 4 has
been settled through a compromise devising a parallel system of re-
source access.25 The parallel system would enable the exploitation of
seabed resources by the international community through a suprana-
tional mining company called the "Enterprise,"2 6 and by private com-
panies through various alternative arrangements. This hard won com-
promise must be maintained and must be made workable if the seabed
regime is going to benefit mankind as a whole.
It is no longer possible to regard the seabed resources as free for
all under the disguise of the freedom of the sea. In fact, it has never
been regarded as such. No past practices, with regard to the exploita-
tion of the international seabed resources beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, indicate any precedent for the freedom of the sea argu-
ment. In fact, the United Nations General Assembly declared in 1970,
without any objection, that the seabed and its resources beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction were the "common heritage of man-
kind '27 and were to be exploited only for the "benefit of mankind as a
whole," ' taking into particular consideration "the interest and needs
of the developing countries.
'29
23. Less developed countries believe that the Enterprise, a public international min-
ing company, should both supervise and implement activities in the Area. Adede, Devel-
oping Countries' Expectations for and Responses to the Seabed Mining Regimes Pro-
posed by the Law of the Sea Conference, in DEEPSEA MINING 193 (J. Kildow ed. 1980).
24. The industralized countries wish to limit the role of the Enterprise. They are
concerned that the Authority will be dominated by the less developed countries that will
direct the Enterprise to make policy based on non-economic criteria. Kobler, Govern-
mental Treatment of Ocean Mining Investment, in DEEPsEA MINING 151 (J. Kildow ed.
1980).
25. Draft Convention, supra note 7, Annex III, arts. 8, 9.
26. Id. Annex IV.
27. Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). See also Pardo, Panel: Whose is
the Bed of the Sea, 62 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 16, 225 (1967).
28. Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, supra note 27.
29. Id.
1981]
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To contend that the principles of the common heritage of mankind
permits the exploitation of the deep seabed only by those who are ca-
pable of exploiting it is, to say the least, illogical and unjust. Such a
contention would lead to the colonization of the international seabed
and its resources solely by those who currently have the technology,
financial capacity and organizational ability to do so. This interpreta-
tion would obviously only benefit private companies and industrialized
countries, thereby making a mockery of the principle of common heri-
tage of mankind. Included in the principle of common heritage are the
following:
(1) such resources should be exploited only under authorization
of the international regime to be established; 0
(2) the "common heritage" should benefit "mankind as a
whole"; 1
(3) "the interests and the needs of the developing countries"
would be given particular consideration;
8 2
(4) "[nlo State or natural or juridical person shall claim, ac-
quire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recovered
from the Area"33 incompatible with the international regime to
be established.
The exploitation of seabed resources by private companies alone, on a
simple profit motive, can hardly be regarded as being for the benefit of
mankind as a whole, much less taking into particular consideration the
interests and needs of the developing countries. It is imperative, in or-
der to give meaning to the concept of the common heritage of man-
kind, that the International Authority through the Enterprise be able
to oversee the exploitation of the seabed resources.
In order to create a workable and viable Enterprise that would
benefit mankind as a whole, with particular consideration being given
to the interests and needs of developing countries, it is essential that
various factors be considered. First, the Enterprise must have sufficient
funding, manpower and technology. Without these elements, the En-
terprise would not be able to compete with private companies of the
industrialized countries who already possess these assets. For this rea-
son, satisfactory financial arrangement for the Enterprise," as well as
the adequate transfers of technology, 5 are essential. Otherwise, the ex-
30. Draft Convention, supra note 7, art. 137(2).
31. Id. art. 140.
32. Id. art. 148.
33. Id. art. 137(3).
34. Id. art. 170(4) provides that "[tlhe Enterprise shall ... be provided with such
funds as it may require to carry out its functions." Id.
35. Id. art. 144(2). "[TIhe Authority and States Parties shall co-operate in promoting
the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area so
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ploitation of seabed resources could only be facilitated by private com-
panies and highly developed industralized countries, thus negating the
basic principle of the common heritage of mankind.
The argument that the exploitation of seabed resources by private
companies on a purely commercial basis will benefit mankind as a
whole, due to the international access to a previously untapped source
of minerals, is not convincing."6 This is due to the fact that companies
would seek as much profit as possible for their own shareholders which,
in practice, would conflict with the principle of common heritage. Fur-
thermore, the companies, for obvious reasons, would be reluctant to
agree to more generous financial arrangements with the International
Authority.
Second, the companies would, due to their own self-interest, be
less sensitive to the negative effects of their seabed mining on the ef-
forts of many developing countries who are also attempting to produce
the same minerals from their land-based resources. The unregulated
exploitation of the mineral resources from the seabed area could de-
stroy the economies of countries that produce the same minerals from
their land-based deposits.3 7 Unhealthy and devastating competition for
certain mineral markets might occur. It should be noted that most of
the current producers of the minerals that would also be produced
from the seabed are developing countries. The economic contribution
of these mineral deposits to the developing countries, although varied
among countries, is extremely important.
Thus, protection is necessary for the developing countries and
some kind of production limitations' for seabed mineral mining is es-
sential if the exploitation of these minerals is going to benefit mankind
as a whole, with particular consideration given to the interests and
needs of the developing countries. Otherwise, the exploitation of these
that the Enterprise and all States Parties may benefit therefrom." Id.
36. See E. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGIME OF HYDROSPACE 110 (1971). Technologically
advanced states with the proper skills and funds will be the only states that may be able
to engage in deep seabed mining on any appreciable scale. Underdeveloped states, in the
absence of a special provision, are unlikely to derive any benefit from the exploitation of
the deep seabed. Id.
37. See Collins, Mineral Exploitation of the Seabed: Problems, Progress, and Alter-
natives, 12 NAT. REsouRcEs L. 599, 644 (1979). Many Third World mineral producing
nations fear that the rapid and unrestricted exploitation of the resources of the deep
seabed will have a devastating price effect on their own economies. These nations, there-
fore, desire a strong international seabed regime that could regulate mineral production
since seabed mineral production would cause price fluctuations and loss of much needed
revenue.
38. Draft Convention, supra note 7, art. 151(1) - (4). "The Authority shall have the
power to limit the level of production of minerals from the Area .... " Id. art. 151(3).
See generally Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211, 215 (1981).
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minerals would, in practice, benefit only the private companies and the
industrialized countries to the detriment of the developing countries
producing the same minerals from land-based resources. The benefits
to the other, non-mineral producing developing countries, under such
circumstances, would only be marginal and perhaps even fictional.
Third, in order to further the development of a viable Enterprise,
to safeguard the economic position of the developing nations' mineral
producers, and to maintain the economic stability of the industrialized
countries, the stability of markets for all such minerals must be safe-
guarded. If private companies of the industrialized countries are given
access to exploit the seabed resources, the market for such minerals in
these countries would then be split among the private companies, the
Enterprise, and the developing countries. Under such a situation, it
would not be difficult to foresee that the mineral productions of the
Enterprise and of the developing countries' would face severe competi-
tion from the productions of private companies of the industrialized
countries. Here again, something must be done to make the Enterprise
workable and viable and to prevent the developing countries mineral
producers from being economically destroyed by private seabed mining
activities.
Fortunately, the Law of the Sea Conference has been able to bring
these conflicting interests somewhat closer together. Various compro-
mise provisions have been reached with regard to financial arrange-
ments, 9 transfer of technology, " production policies for the seabed
minerals such as the production limitation formula4 1 and many other
related issues. If the review process of the United States threatens
these delicately balanced compromises achieved during several years of
negotiation, the prospect of success for the Law of the Sea Conference
with United States participation would be very bleak indeed.
Various possibilities now seem open to the United States. I hope
that the United States review process will result in a better apprecia-
tion for the objective of the global negotiation process through the
United Nations system to achieve peace, stability, cooperation and de-
velopment in ocean affairs. I also hope that the United States will un-
derstand that it too has a great deal at stake in ocean affairs and that
its interest would be better protected through a global multilateral ar-
rangement, mutually agreed upon rather than imposed by sheer force.
Consequently, the United States should conclude that the Law of the
39. Draft Convention, supra note 7, Annex III, art. 13(1)-(15).
40. Draft Convention, supra note 7, art. 144; Annex III art. 5(1)-(8). See generally
Silverstein, Propriety Protection For Deepsea Mining Technology In Return For Tech-
nology Transfer: New Approach To The Seabeds Controversy, 60 J. PAT. OF. Soc'v 135
(1978).
41. Collins, supra note 37.
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Sea treaty will bring great benefits to the United States in many fields
including free navigation, access to resources, and the protection of the
environment. Also, the United States should understand that the Law
of the Sea Conference will provide the best protection for an orderly
development of the seabed resources, thus guaranteeing the stability
and continuity of the raw materials for the expanding industries of the
industrialized countries. Whatever compromises the United States has
to give in order to develop a viable Enterprise and to prevent the col-
lapse of the economy of many developing countries, those compromises
would be a small price for the United States to pay for the enormous
benefits it would reap as a result of the Law of the Sea Convention.
Moreover, should the United States decide that it is prepared to
abandon the Conference, if the Conference does not concur with its
extremely nationalistic demands on a few seabed mining issues, then
various consequences might follow. I doubt that the United States
would be able to benefit from other provisions in the Convention that
are favorable to it without becoming a party to the Convention as a
whole. It has always been understood that the Convention would con-
tain a comprehensive, grand package. It has never been understood
that the package would contain only those provisions that are advanta-
geous to one country, while leaving out others that are not.
The United States might contemplate the creation of various mini-
treaties, with like-minded states, on various subjects of the Law of the
Sea. Such mini-treaties - the reciprocal states agreements - would
not only be contrary to the general understanding of the 1970 General
Assembly Resolution, but would also be unworkable. Various mini-
treaties among like-minded states on various issues would simply bring
us back to square one, and would unnecessarily result in total confu-
sion and chaos in ocean affairs. For instance, who could prevent like-
minded states from developing mini-treaties of their own, and oppos-
ing the mini-treaties of the others? This is a real possibility for seabed
mineral mining in view of the fact that the seabed area is beyond the
limit of national jurisdiction and its resources have already been de-
clared to be the common heritage of mankind. Thus, there could be no
monopoly of mini-treaties in this area. I find it difficult to see how such
a situation could safeguard the interests of the United States and other
industrialized powers who have great interests in all parts of the world.
The United States and other industrialized countries have contem-
plated the enactment of unilateral legislation regarding deep seabed
mining. In fact, the United States has already enacted such legisla-
tion4 2 and the other industrialized countries are not far behind.4 3 It is,
42. The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553
(1980) [hereinafter cited as the Act]. The developed countries, contending that the rule
of the Authority should be minimized, enacted unilateral national legislation on the basis
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however, more difficult to comprehend why unilateral legislation on
seabed mining issues should be a more viable alternative. The develop-
ing countries have clearly indicated that unilateral legislation and lim-
ited agreements (mini-treaties) are illegal as violations of the principle
of the common heritage of mankind." It is inconceivable that the ex-
ploitation of seabed minerals under unilateral legislation would be con-
sidered a secure basis for the supply of minerals to the industrial coun-
tries, especially since it has been challenged as illegal by the world
community. Like the mini-treaties approach, the unilateral legislation
approach would be equally unworkable and would only create confu-
sion and conflict. Who would prevent states that oppose the unilateral
legislation from enacting their own national legislation to deny the va-
lidity of the other national legislation? Unilateral legislation and mini-
treaties, therefore, are not, and cannot be viable alternatives in seeking
a regime for seabed mining. Most important of all, no private company
is likely to invest in a confusing and conflicting regime of unilateral
legislations and mini-treaties, since the security of their investment
would not be assured and the risk would be too high.
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that the Law of the Sea Conference be concluded
as soon as possible. This conclusion must be in line with principles
outlined earlier in the treaty negotiations, namely, to conclude a com-
perhensive treaty covering all topics of ocean affairs, including seabed
mining. The Conference to date has achieved enormous results and
compromises on many complex issues, which would promote stability
and progress in ocean affairs. The adoption of the important principle
of the common heritage of mankind for the seabed areas beyond the
of the principle of the freedom of the seas. The developing countries found it inconceiv-
able that the developed countries could take unilateral action after acknowledging the
principle of Common Heritage of Mankind. Djalal, The Developing Countries and the
Law of the Sea Conference, 15 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 22, 28 (1980).
43. E.g., Federal Republic of Germany: Act of August 17, 1980 on Interim Regulation
of Deep Seabed Mining, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1330 (1980). The German law provides a
licensing system whereby the holders of the license are given exclusive right to acquire
ownership and explore the seabed resources. But upon Germany's entry into any interna-
tional agreement on deep seabed mining, all license holders will have to re-apply for
twenty year permits, acceptance being based on the amount of investment already made
into the seabed and when the exploration of the resources began. Id. at 1331.
44. See Declaration of the Group of 77, U.N. Docs. A/34/611 (Oct. 23, 1979), A/
Conf.62/94 (Oct. 19, 1979). See also Vicuna, The Regime For the Exploitation of the
Seabed Mineral Resources and the Quest For a New International Economic Order of
the Oceans: A Latin-American View, 10 LAw Am. 774 (1978). Vicuna points out the
developing countries' view that the exploitation of a common heritage of mankind must
benefit mankind as a whole and not those nations that have the capital and the technol-
ogy to undertake mining. Id. at 776.
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limits of national jursdiction will result in an international regime on
the seabed that will benefit mankind as a whole as well as protect the
interest and needs of the developing countries. A great deal of progress
and many compromises have been achieved in translating these princi-
ples into treaty provisions. The few remaining issues must not be al-
lowed to disrupt the goal of concluding the Law of the Sea Convention
on a comprehensive basis.
Unilateral leglsiation of mini-treaties among like-minded states
are not viable or workable alternatives for the regime of the interna-
tional seabed and its resources. These alternatives would only lead to
chaos, confusion and conflicts. It is clear that such a situation of con-
flict would not be conducive to rational management and development
of seabed mineral resources.
The review process in the United States has caused anxiety in the
Conference. I hope, however, that through its review process, the
United States will gain a deeper appreciation of how its interests will
be better served and protected by the Law of the Sea Conference. I
further hope that the United States will return to the Conference and
be prepared to conclude negotations on the remaining issues as soon as
possible. Whatever the motives of the Reagan administration for con-
ducting the review at this late stage of negotiation, the net result has
been a near-total isolation of the United States in the world commu-
nity of nations. This in turn has cuased deep misgivings about the
United States' intentions and its negotiating techniques. In view of its
global role, it is difficult to comprehend why such an isolation is in the
interest of the United States.
1981]

